This is the fourth post in a series exploring a possible cognitive theory of genre. The first, appearing here, covered some basic concepts from contemporary cognitive science. The second focused on prototype theory, script theory, and relevance theory. The third began to lay out some of the issues in genre theory where attention from a… Continue reading Cognitive genre theory IV: More thoughts on new theory & conclusion

(Updated 4/3/13 with correction regarding Schank and Abelson story about Dr. Schank’s daughter.) This is the third post in a series exploring a possible cognitive theory of genre. The first, appearing here, covered some basic concepts from contemporary cognitive science. The second focused on prototype theory, script theory, and relevance theory. You’ll find this post… Continue reading Cognitive genre theory III: First steps toward new theory

This is the second post in a series exploring a possible cognitive theory of genre. The first, appearing here, covered some concepts from contemporary cognitive science. You’ll find this post easier if you read the previous one. Not all the developments in cognitive science that are relevant to a cognitive theory of genre post-date the… Continue reading Cognitive genre theory II: Likenesses, scripts, and relevance

I’ve been posting the answers I’ve given to the written prelim exams for my PhD. (My specialty exam answer appears here.) Note that I have not provided the examiners’ questions. That’s because it’s considered impolite to share an examiner’s question without his/her permission. Anyway, here is my answer to the rhetoric question I received. Please… Continue reading Cognitive genre theory I: Intro & writing as situated problem-solving

This post is the fourth (and final) in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams and introduces the questions I want to discuss. The second addresses a problem in legal theory—exemplary reasoning—and one with it—its failure to distinguish when it’s attempting to be explanatory… Continue reading LLL IV: A view based on my practice and interview research

This post is the third in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams and introduces the questions I want to discuss. The second addresses a problem in legal theory—exemplary reasoning—and one with it—its failure to distinguish when it’s attempting to be explanatory and when… Continue reading LLL III: Rhetoric’s constitutive role and logic’s rightful one

This post is the second in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams. This one might make a lot more sense if you start with that one. Legal theory has an uneasy relationship with rhetoric. Like scientists, lawyers and judges to not like to… Continue reading LLL II: A problem in legal theory, and with it

I’m scheduled to give a presentation at the 4Cs in Las Vegas on Friday, March 15, 2013, titled “Examining a Twitter-Based Discourse Community of Composition Scholars.” The program is part of a panel (J.15 on the program) scheduled at 2:00 p.m. in the Capri 110 Room on the first floor of the Riviera Hotel. Other… Continue reading 4C13 J.15 Problems while examining Twitter-based discourse communities

Rhetoric and law are, and always have been, in a close embrace. Classical texts on rhetoric always associate it with adjudication; whether they also associate it with deliberation and epideictic varies. Of course, there are those for whom that embrace constitutes an illicit or at least secret affair, who believe the only lawful marriage is between law and logic. On the other hand are those who view law as exclusively or principally rhetorical. Even those, like Hasian et al. (1996), who claim to steer a middle course, tend to favor one view over the other.

I’m thinking about the machinery of Aristotle’s Organon. These are the works in which Aristotle lays out his theories of logic and demonstration. Here are the works typically included in the group and a brief coverage of their contents: Categories: Aristotle explains the highest genera (sing. genus), which are called categories (Lat. predicamenta). Though we… Continue reading Aristotle’s Organon, his On Rhetoric, and the law