Rhetoricked

(Updated 4/3/13 with correction regarding Schank and Abelson story about Dr. Schank’s daughter.) This is the third post in a series exploring a possible cognitive theory of genre. The first, appearing here, covered some basic concepts from contemporary cognitive science. The second focused on prototype theory, script theory, and relevance theory. You’ll find this post easier if you read the previous ones. I should note at the outset that what I propose here as a “cognitive theory of genre” is not fully theorized or set into the context of all the genre-related research that has preceded it. (That’s a euphemistic Read More …

This is the second post in a series exploring a possible cognitive theory of genre. The first, appearing here, covered some concepts from contemporary cognitive science. You’ll find this post easier if you read the previous one. Not all the developments in cognitive science that are relevant to a cognitive theory of genre post-date the “social turn” in genre theory signaled by Miller (1984). In fact, two important earlier developments have been cited in the genre literature, albeit in ways that suggest they are misunderstood or misapplied or were not attended to in a fashion that exploits their utility for Read More …

I’ve been posting the answers I’ve given to the written prelim exams for my PhD. (My specialty exam answer appears here.) Note that I have not provided the examiners’ questions. That’s because it’s considered impolite to share an examiner’s question without his/her permission. Anyway, here is my answer to the rhetoric question I received. Please be charitable if you are reading these posts. I’m only lightly editing them as I cut them from the exam I wrote in a hurried 24 hours. This series of posts explores the possibility of a cognitive theory of genre. It does so tentatively and Read More …

This post is the fourth (and final) in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams and introduces the questions I want to discuss. The second addresses a problem in legal theory—exemplary reasoning—and one with it—its failure to distinguish when it’s attempting to be explanatory and when normative. The third takes up the constitutive role of rhetoric in the law and the still-necessary role of logic. This post might make a lot more sense if you start with the earlier ones. This final post in this series takes up questions Read More …

This post is the third in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams and introduces the questions I want to discuss. The second addresses a problem in legal theory—exemplary reasoning—and one with it—its failure to distinguish when it’s attempting to be explanatory and when normative. This post might make a lot more sense if you start with the earlier ones. Rhetorical principles constitute the law, and nowhere is that more evident than in the courts’ rules of procedure. Hermagoras of Temnos, writing in the first or second century BCE, Read More …

This post is the second in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams. This one might make a lot more sense if you start with that one. Legal theory has an uneasy relationship with rhetoric. Like scientists, lawyers and judges to not like to acknowledge that the work they do is influenced by “mere rhetoric.” This section of this essay addresses several facets of legal theory and the relationship of each to rhetoric. For each facet, I attempt to identify how legal theory’s stance with regard to it is Read More …

I’m scheduled to give a presentation at the 4Cs in Las Vegas on Friday, March 15, 2013, titled “Examining a Twitter-Based Discourse Community of Composition Scholars.” The program is part of a panel (J.15 on the program) scheduled at 2:00 p.m. in the Capri 110 Room on the first floor of the Riviera Hotel. Other scheduled participants: Chair of the session, Cara Kozma of High Point University; presenter Jen Michaels of The Ohio State University; and presenter Kristin Mock of University of Arizona. (Unfortunately, Kristin will not be able to make it. We’re sorry to miss her but are likely Read More …

Rhetoric and law are, and always have been, in a close embrace. Classical texts on rhetoric always associate it with adjudication; whether they also associate it with deliberation and epideictic varies. Of course, there are those for whom that embrace constitutes an illicit or at least secret affair, who believe the only lawful marriage is between law and logic. On the other hand are those who view law as exclusively or principally rhetorical. Even those, like Hasian et al. (1996), who claim to steer a middle course, tend to favor one view over the other. Read More …

I’m thinking about the machinery of Aristotle’s Organon. These are the works in which Aristotle lays out his theories of logic and demonstration. Here are the works typically included in the group and a brief coverage of their contents: Categories: Aristotle explains the highest genera (sing. genus), which are called categories (Lat. predicamenta). Though we think of the categories as things that can be said of something, this work was not intended (on most accounts) to be about linguistic predication, but rather about ontology, the nature of the being of a substance or ousia. Interpretations: In this work, the philosopher Read More …

(During February, I plan to post once each day or so on this blog as I read and think through the texts on my PhD prelim exam reading list. I take the exams during the first two weeks of March. You can read about the reading list here. The post topics will vary, with some coming from each of my four topical lists.) American lawyers, judges, and legal scholars have a complicated relationship with rhetoric. This stems in part from a lack of clarity about what is meant by ‘rhetoric.’ We can comfortably conclude that for most in the legal Read More …