I’ve been posting the answers I’ve given to the written prelim exams for my PhD. (My specialty exam answer appears here.) Note that I have not provided the examiners’ questions. That’s because it’s considered impolite to share an examiner’s question without his/her permission. Anyway, here is my answer to the rhetoric question I received. Please… Continue reading Cognitive genre theory I: Intro & writing as situated problem-solving

This post is the fourth (and final) in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams and introduces the questions I want to discuss. The second addresses a problem in legal theory—exemplary reasoning—and one with it—its failure to distinguish when it’s attempting to be explanatory… Continue reading LLL IV: A view based on my practice and interview research

This post is the third in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams and introduces the questions I want to discuss. The second addresses a problem in legal theory—exemplary reasoning—and one with it—its failure to distinguish when it’s attempting to be explanatory and when… Continue reading LLL III: Rhetoric’s constitutive role and logic’s rightful one

This post is the second in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams. This one might make a lot more sense if you start with that one. Legal theory has an uneasy relationship with rhetoric. Like scientists, lawyers and judges to not like to… Continue reading LLL II: A problem in legal theory, and with it

I’m scheduled to give a presentation at the 4Cs in Las Vegas on Friday, March 15, 2013, titled “Examining a Twitter-Based Discourse Community of Composition Scholars.” The program is part of a panel (J.15 on the program) scheduled at 2:00 p.m. in the Capri 110 Room on the first floor of the Riviera Hotel. Other… Continue reading 4C13 J.15 Problems while examining Twitter-based discourse communities

Rhetoric and law are, and always have been, in a close embrace. Classical texts on rhetoric always associate it with adjudication; whether they also associate it with deliberation and epideictic varies. Of course, there are those for whom that embrace constitutes an illicit or at least secret affair, who believe the only lawful marriage is between law and logic. On the other hand are those who view law as exclusively or principally rhetorical. Even those, like Hasian et al. (1996), who claim to steer a middle course, tend to favor one view over the other.

I’m thinking about the machinery of Aristotle’s Organon. These are the works in which Aristotle lays out his theories of logic and demonstration. Here are the works typically included in the group and a brief coverage of their contents: Categories: Aristotle explains the highest genera (sing. genus), which are called categories (Lat. predicamenta). Though we… Continue reading Aristotle’s Organon, his On Rhetoric, and the law

(During February, I plan to post once each day or so on this blog as I read and think through the texts on my PhD prelim exam reading list. I take the exams during the first two weeks of March. You can read about the reading list here. The post topics will vary, with some… Continue reading Stance of the American legal system toward ‘rhetoric’: Intro

Below is the text of my prepared remarks for a roundtable at the Modern Language Association convention in January 2013. (This version is slightly longer than the one to be delivered live, due to time constraints of live delivery). Here’s the blurb for the session from the program: Session 22/”Expanding Access: Building Bridges within Digital… Continue reading Expanding Access: Building Bridges within DH