LLL IV: A view based on my practice and interview research

This post is the fourth (and final) in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams and introduces the questions I want to discuss. The second addresses a problem in legal theory—exemplary reasoning—and one with it—its failure to distinguish when it’s attempting to be explanatory and when normative. The third takes up the constitutive role of rhetoric in the law and the still-necessary role of logic. This post might make a lot more sense if you start with the earlier ones. This final post in this series takes up questions Read More …

LLL III: Rhetoric’s constitutive role and logic’s rightful one

This post is the third in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams and introduces the questions I want to discuss. The second addresses a problem in legal theory—exemplary reasoning—and one with it—its failure to distinguish when it’s attempting to be explanatory and when normative. This post might make a lot more sense if you start with the earlier ones. Rhetorical principles constitute the law, and nowhere is that more evident than in the courts’ rules of procedure. Hermagoras of Temnos, writing in the first or second century BCE, Read More …

LLL II: A problem in legal theory, and with it

This post is the second in a series. The first post explains how I’ve excerpted these posts from one of my PhD prelim exams. This one might make a lot more sense if you start with that one. Legal theory has an uneasy relationship with rhetoric. Like scientists, lawyers and judges to not like to acknowledge that the work they do is influenced by “mere rhetoric.” This section of this essay addresses several facets of legal theory and the relationship of each to rhetoric. For each facet, I attempt to identify how legal theory’s stance with regard to it is Read More …

4C13 J.15 Problems while examining Twitter-based discourse communities

I’m scheduled to give a presentation at the 4Cs in Las Vegas on Friday, March 15, 2013, titled “Examining a Twitter-Based Discourse Community of Composition Scholars.” The program is part of a panel (J.15 on the program) scheduled at 2:00 p.m. in the Capri 110 Room on the first floor of the Riviera Hotel. Other scheduled participants: Chair of the session, Cara Kozma of High Point University; presenter Jen Michaels of The Ohio State University; and presenter Kristin Mock of University of Arizona. (Unfortunately, Kristin will not be able to make it. We’re sorry to miss her but are likely Read More …

Law, logic, language I: Where I may be setting up a straw man…

Rhetoric and law are, and always have been, in a close embrace. Classical texts on rhetoric always associate it with adjudication; whether they also associate it with deliberation and epideictic varies. Of course, there are those for whom that embrace constitutes an illicit or at least secret affair, who believe the only lawful marriage is between law and logic. On the other hand are those who view law as exclusively or principally rhetorical. Even those, like Hasian et al. (1996), who claim to steer a middle course, tend to favor one view over the other. Read More …

Aristotle’s Organon, his On Rhetoric, and the law

I’m thinking about the machinery of Aristotle’s Organon. These are the works in which Aristotle lays out his theories of logic and demonstration. Here are the works typically included in the group and a brief coverage of their contents: Categories: Aristotle explains the highest genera (sing. genus), which are called categories (Lat. predicamenta). Though we think of the categories as things that can be said of something, this work was not intended (on most accounts) to be about linguistic predication, but rather about ontology, the nature of the being of a substance or ousia. Interpretations: In this work, the philosopher Read More …

Stance of the American legal system toward ‘rhetoric’: Intro

(During February, I plan to post once each day or so on this blog as I read and think through the texts on my PhD prelim exam reading list. I take the exams during the first two weeks of March. You can read about the reading list here. The post topics will vary, with some coming from each of my four topical lists.) American lawyers, judges, and legal scholars have a complicated relationship with rhetoric. This stems in part from a lack of clarity about what is meant by ‘rhetoric.’ We can comfortably conclude that for most in the legal Read More …

Expanding Access: Building Bridges within DH

Below is the text of my prepared remarks for a roundtable at the Modern Language Association convention in January 2013. (This version is slightly longer than the one to be delivered live, due to time constraints of live delivery). Here’s the blurb for the session from the program: Session 22/”Expanding Access: Building Bridges within Digital Humanities.” Thursday, 12:00 noon–1:15 p.m., 205, Hynes. A special session. Presiding: Trent M. Kays, Univ. of Minnesota, Twin Cities; Lee Skallerup Bessette, Morehead State Univ. Speakers: Marc Fortin, Queen’s Univ.; Alexander Gil, Univ. of Virginia; Brian Larson, Univ. of Minnesota, Twin Cities; Sophie Marcotte, Concordia Univ.; Read More …

Juarrero, Dynamics in Action, Chapter 13

Juarrero, A. (1999). Threading an agent’s control loop through the environment (Chapter 13). Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System (pp. 195–213). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. This chapter can be summed up with the question, “How do we decide to do what we intend to do?” (p. 196). Juarerro rules out AI systems that work through the entire solution space (relies too much on processing with “brute speed); and expert systems where all the relevant rules and contingencies have to be programmed into the system in advance. The first question is whether intentions are meanings in the Read More …

Juarrero, Dynamics in Action, Chapter 9

This is the first of three chapters of Juarrero’s book about which I’ve written summaries/reviews. The first two (Chapters 9 and 13) really just open the doors to the last (Chapter 14), which I find interesting for my own work. Juarrero, A. (1999). Constraints as causes: the intersection of information theory and complex systems dynamics (Chapter 9). Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System (pp. 131–150). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. In Chapter 9 of Dynamics in Action, Juarrero sets out to analyze the “interlevel causality of dynamical systems—as the workings of constraint” (p. 131). One of her Read More …